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ABSTRACT
This paper highlights the nexus of 
in te ra c tio n s among finan cial, 
indu strial and m acroeconom ic 
factors determining the Pareto 
optimal date in which the firm’s 
claim ants stop collaborating and 
force the firm into liquidation. The 
condition for optimal liquidation 
time sum m arises the effects of 
volatility of the aggregate consumer 
income and the overall price level, 
demand elasticity, the industry’s 
concentration level and depreciation 
on the firm’s going-concern value. 
It also takes into account the effects 
of the firm’s level of indebtedness, 
forgone interest on alternative usage 
of the financial resources extended 
to the firm and the costs of risk 
bearing perceived by the firm’s 




Though financial distress is a necessary condition for 
bankruptcy it is not a sufficient one. It has been argued by 
Bulow and Shoven (1978) that the criterion for bankruptcy is a 
positive gain to the coalition of the firm's claimants from 
immediate liquidation and hence a firm's operation might be 
liquidated (continued) even when its going-concern value 
exceeds (is below) its liquidation value. Using a similar 
analytical framework, White (1980) has further examined the 
social efficiency properties of alternative priority rules in 
liquidation, including the 'me-first' rule, and has concluded 
that those rules are not socially efficient, except under very 
strong assumptions about the payment to the bondholder and 
the interest rates on bonds. In contrast, Ang and Chua (1980) 
have stressed the important role of the 'me-first' rule in 
bankruptcy-liquidation decision. They have argued that as long 
as the firm's claimants are value maximisers and the 'me-first' 
rule is not violated the liquidation of a firm in a financial 
distress should take place when the firm's liquidation value 
exceeds its going-concern value, no matter what coalitions of 
the firm's claimants are formed.
In all of the aforementioned studies of the liquidation 
decision the outcomes have a zero-one characteristic. That is, 
either an immediate liquidation of the firm, or a continuation 
of its operation. The length of the continuation period has not 
been analysed. A possible justification for ignoring that aspect 
is that new information is accumulated as time progresses and, 
therefore, it might be sub-optimal to determine the duration of 
the insolvent firm 's continued operation in advance. 
However, when alternatives are time-dependent and span 
more than a single period, high-priority claimants need to 
know in advance the length of the period in which their
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collaboration with low-priority claimants in continuing the 
insolvent firm's operation is required. This information is 
essential for identifying the alternatives given up and 
assessing compensation for the forgone income from those 
alternatives, as well as for the excessive risk bearing. Hence, it 
is useful to study this neglected issue.
The conceptual analysis of the continuation period and 
liquidation timing developed in this paper refers to a 
financially distressed firm operating in a oligopolistic industry 
and facing a random demand for its product due to 
fluctuations of aggregate consumer income and overall price 
level. In order to simplify the mathematical analysis, the 
definition of the firm's claimants includes a stockholder and a 
bondholder (or any other lender) only. Both claimants have 
unbiased expectations about the firm's future operating profits; 
but may differ with regard to the degree of absolute risk 
aversion, assessment of the level of uncertainty involved in 
the firm 's future operation and priority on the firm's 
liquidation proceeds. It is assumed that the financial crisis 
arises from the firm's current inability to pay back the bond 
value which matures in the present period. In liquidation, 
bond principal claim and interest payments would be paid first. 
It is also assumed that the firm's immediate liquidation value 
is at least as large as the firm's liabilities. Due to uncertainty 
about future returns from continuation and the existence of 
alternatives, the bondholder (or any other lender), unless 
sufficiently compensated, is not willing to extend the bond (or 
loan) maturity period and calls for an immediate liquidation; 
whereas the stockholder considers backing the firm as long as 
the expected returns from doing so sufficiently exceeds the 
costs of keeping the firm solvent. These costs consist of the 
costs of risk bearing and the compensation payments required 
for keeping the bondholder at least as well off as under
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immediate liquidation while extending the bond's maturity 
period. Of course, when these costs exceed the stockholder's 
expected returns from continuation, the stockholder also 
prefers an immediate liquidation of the firm's assets. Thus, an 
interior solution to the problem of optimal liquidation time 
exists when the net returns to the stockholder from 
continuation are non negative.
Along these lines the paper continues as follows. The 
second section describes the claim ants' returns from 
continuation. The third section presents the claimants' 
evaluations of those net returns and the collaboration decision 
problem. The fourth section derives the optimal collaboration 
period and the condition for immediate liquidation. The fifth 
section displays and interprets geometrically the optimal 
collaboration period under various assumptions about the 
claimants' rates of time preference. The sixth section discusses 
the comparative statics' properties of the collaboration period. 
Following Altman (1971) and Levy and Bar-Niv (1987), who 
have found that the corporate failure rate in the US is 
correlated with the fluctuations of the GNP and the overall 
price level, the seventh section incorporates the effects of 
macroeconomic conditions, as well as industrial conditions, on 
the firm's expected profits and going-concern value and 
consequently on the collaboration period.
2 CLAIMANTS' RETURNS FROM CONTINUATION
The conceptual framework uses the following notations:
T = the firm's liquidation date;
t = a continuous time index, 0 <t <T;
So = the liquidation value of the firm's productive 
assets at t = 0;
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Bo = the bond (or any other liabilities) claim against 
the firm at t = 0 ; 
nit) = the firm's operating profit at f;
S = a fixed rate of depreciation of the firm's 
productive assets; 
i = the bond's contracted interest rate; 
y = the bondholder's subjective discounting rate; 
p  = the stockholder's subjective discounting rate;
C = the present value of the compensation payment 
to the bondholder for continuation to T; 
ys(T) = the (random) present value of the net returns to 
the stockholder from continuation to T;and 
yb(T) = the (random) present value of the net returns to 
the bondholder from continuation to T.
The collaboration period (0,T) is determined by a consensus 
reached by the firm's claimants. It is assumed, for simplicity, 
that the sale price of the firm's productive assets remains the 
same over time and that there is no income tax. In this case, 
the present expected value of the net returns to the stockholder 
from keeping the firm solvent during the time interval (0 ,T) is 
the sum of the discounted operating profits, minus the 
depreciation costs, plus the salvage value of the firm's assets, 
minus the liabilities at the end of the period and minus the 
compensation payment to the bondholder:
T
E[ys(T)] = fe-P‘ {E[n(t)] -5S0}d t + So - BoeO-PV - C. (1) 
0
The first and the second terms on the right-hand side of 
equation 1 are constructed under the assumption that, due to 
its financial difficulties, the firm's net investment is zero. The
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third term on the right-hand side of equation 1 reflects the 
assumption that in a case of continuation the firm receives a 
grace period (0 ,T ). That is, the interest on bond is accumulated 
and paid at T. The firm's liabilities are discounted by the 
stockholder's subjective rate, p. Cash or other liquid assets, are 
not included in equation 1. Their inclusion will not change the 
analysis considerably. It is assumed in the following that the 
firm's instantaneous expected profit remains the same as time 
progresses. Thus, the discounted expected value of the net 
returns to the stockholder from keeping the firm solvent 
during the time interval (0, T) can be equivalently rendered as
E[ys(T)] =—  lE(n)- SSoJd - e-pT) + S0 - B0e^P)T - C. (2) 
P
Correspondingly, the present value of the expected net 
returns to the bondholder from continuation are
E[yb(T)l = Boe«-r)T + C . (3)
Here, the first term on the right-hand side indicates the value 
of the principal and the accumulated interest discounted by the 
bondholder's rate of return on the alternative transaction; and 
the second term on the right-hand side represents the value of 
the compensation received by the bondholder for continuation 
to T.
It is assumed that the claimants' expectations about their net 
returns from continuation are unbiased, but, naturally, reflect 
increased uncertainty as the collaboration period expands. 
More specifically, the claimants' expected net returns from 
continuation to T , y se(T) and ybe(T), are assumed to be 
normally distributed with means which are equal to the
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theoretical values presented by equation 2 and equation 3, and 
with variances which are proportional to the collaboration's 
period, a s^T and a ^ T ,  respectively. This is equivalent to 
arguing that the expected net returns to the stockholder and 
bondholder from continuation to T can be approximated by 
Wiener processes (Brownian motion).
3 CLAIM AN TS' PREFERENCES AND THE COLLABOR­
ATION DECISION PROBLEM
It is postulated that both claimants maximise expected utility 
and that their preferences on the expected net returns can be 
represented by utility functions which, in order to simplify the 
mathematical analysis, reflect constant degrees of absolute risk 
aversion Rs and Rb, respectively:
Uj(yf(T)) = 1 - exp{- Rjyf(T)} for j  = 5, b. (4)
With this specification of U, the expected utility functions can 
be displayed as
00
E(Uj) = 1- J exp{-Rjyf(T)} <pj(yf(T)) dyf(T) = 1 - m(-Rj)
— 00
for j  = s,b  (5)
where m is the moment-generating function  associated with 
the distribution of y f(T ).
Given that yf(T )  is normally distributed we obtain
E(Uj) = 1 -ex p  {-R jE [yf(T)l + 0.5 R f t f T )  fo r  j  = 5 , b. (6)
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Since the bondholder prefers an immediate liquidation (that is, 
T = 0) upon continuation of the firm's operation, unless 
sufficiently compensated, the Pareto optimal collaboration 
period can be found by specifying the stockholder's decision 
problem as follows
max E[Us(y /(T ))]
T
subject to
E[Ub(ybe(T))] = E[Ub(y,f (()))]■ (7)
The constraint reflects the compensation payment, C, required 
to keep the bondholder at least as well off as under immediate 
liquidation. In view of equations 6 and 3, this constraint can be 
rendered as
RblBoed-ryi' + C] - 0.5Rh2o h2T = RbB0. (8)
Hence,
C = B0[ l  - ed -rF 1 + 0 J  Rb o b2T. (9)
That is, in order to postpone the liquidation of the firm to T, 
the bondholder should be paid the forgone interest differential 
between his or her alternative financial investment and the 
firm's bond plus the costs of risk-bearings which are equal to 
the product of the perceived level of uncertainty associated 
with his or her net returns from continuation to T and his or 
her degree of absolute risk aversion.
Summing up, the Pareto optimal collaboration period can 
be found by solving the stockholder decision problem
max {1 - exp{-RsE[ys(T)J + 0.5Rs2a 2T}} 
T
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where Elys(T)] is given by equation 2 and C by equation 9.
4 OPTIMAL COLLABORATION PERIOD AND THE 
CONDITION FOR IMMEDIATE LIQUIDATION
Since maximising (l-exp(-RsE[ys(T)]+0.5Rs2os2T}) is equivalent 
to maximising the risk deducted expected return from 
continuation to the stockholder (E[ys(T)]-0.5Rsa s^T}, the Pareto 
optimal collaboration period (T°) should satisfy the first-order 
condition
[E (x )-S S 0]e-'sr° = [ ( i -p ) e ('-pr> + (Y - i ) e ^ °  ]B0 + 0.%Rb<y2b + R a ])
(10)
and the second-order condition
H = - p  [E(n)-SS0J e pT°- (i - p)2 Boed-P)T° + (i-tfB oed-P )1* < 0.
(11)
Furthermore, by setting T° to be equal to zero in equation 10 
we obtain that the condition for immediate liquidation is:
E ( k )~  8S0 = (y -p ) f i0 +0.5(Rbo l  +Rsc%) (12)
That is, the financially distressed firm should be immediately 
forced into liquidation if the expected profit after depreciation 
obtained from an infinitesimal continuation of the firm's 
operation (the term on the left-hand side) is just equal to the 
cost of doing so in terms of the forgone interest on the 
alternative financial investm ent for the bondholder, 
discounted by the stockholder rate of time preference, and the
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costs of risk-bearing for both claimants. Of course, immediate 
liquidation is also optimal when the expected profit gained 
from infinitesimal continuation is overweighed by the costs.
5 GEOMETRICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SOLUTION 
UNDER V A RIO U S A SSU M PTIO N S ABOUT THE 
CLAIMANTS' RATES OF TIME PREFERENCE
The left-hand side of equation 10 indicates the marginal benefit 
from continuation (M BFC ) to the stockholder, whereas the 
right-hand side is the marginal cost of continuation (MCOC). 
The slope of the MBFC  curve in the T-$ plane is given by the 
first term on the left-hand side of inequality 11 :
^ £ = - p [  E (x )-S S 0]e-+ 
dT (13)
In the following we consider the nontrivial case where the 
expected instantaneous profit after depreciation, E ( n ) - S S 0, is 
positive and hence the MBFC curve is downward sloping.
Similarly, the slope of the MCOC curve in the T-$ plane is 
equal to the sum of the second and third terms on the left- 
hand side of the second-order condition 11, and hence
dM COC> i - p > (p_r)r . . . .------------=0 a s — (14)
dT < i - y <
or, equivalently,
dMCOC > > .
------------=0 as y= p . 15)
dT  <
That is, if the bondholder' rate of time preference is greater, 
equal to, or smaller than the stockholder's rate of time 
preference, the MCOC curve is upward sloping, flat, or 
downward sloping, respectively, as displayed by Figures la to
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Id. These figures has been drawn under the assumption that 
the expected instantaneous profit after depreciation (that is, the 
left hand side of equation 12 and the intercept of the MBFC 
curve) exceeds the instantaneous cost of continuation (that is, 
the right-hand side of equation 12 and the intercept of the 
MCOC curve). As argued earlier, under the alternative 
assumption that the expected instantaneous profit net of 
depreciation is equal to, or smaller than, the instantaneous 
costs of continuation, the stockholder prefers an immediate 
liquidation of the firm. Figures la to Id indicate that the period 
of collaboration is longer the smaller the discrepancy between 
the bondholder's and the stockholder's rates of time 
preference, and can even be infinite when p  is sufficiently 
larger than 7  so that the MCOC curve is downward sloping and 
lying entirely below the MBFC curve. This conclusion is valid 
as long asp  is held constant while 7  is lowered and moderates 
the slope of the MCOC curve as we move from Figure la to 
Figure Id. The underlying rationale is that y represents the 
bondholder's opportunity costs, and, hence, the lower 7 the 
smaller the compensation payment required for keeping the 
bondholder as well of as under immediate liquidation, and, 
subsequently, the longer the period of continuation desired by 
the stockholder.
11
Figure lb : y= p
12
13
It is important to note, however, that if we also allow p to rise 
within the open unit interval (0 ,1) the MCOC curve is 
flattened and shifted downward as the discounted 
compensation costs diminish, whereas the MBFC curve is 
steepened and tilted toward the origin as the discounted 
expected future profit diminishes. Thus, the net effect of an 
hypothetical rise in the stockholder's rate of time preference on 
the collaboration period is not clear, a-priori, as displayed by 
Figure 2a and Figure 2b.
Figure 2a: A rise in p shortens T°
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6 COMPARATIVE STATICS
Due to the complexity of equation 10, a closed-form solution to 
the Pareto optimal collaboration period cannot be obtained. 
Nevertheless, the effects of the firm 's initial level of 
indebtedness and capital stock, depreciation rate, expected 
profit and uncertainty on the continuation period can be 
obtained by taking the total differential equation 10 and 
considering the second-order condition 11 as summarised in 
propositions 1 to 5 and displayed diagramatically by shifting 
the MBFC and MCOC curves. The proofs to these propositions 
are provided by the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (the effect of the firm's initial liabilities B0): If the 
bondholder's time preference rate exceeds the stockholder's
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time preference rate (that is, y > p), the greater the firm's initial 
liabilities the shorter the collaboration period. In contrast, if 
the stockholder's rate of time preference exceeds the 
bondholder's rate of time preference, the greater the firm's 
initial liabilities the longer the collaboration period. If, 
however, both claimants have the same rate of time 
preference, the collaboration period is not affected by the firm's 
initial liabilities.
The geometrical interpretation of this proposition is as 
follows. When y > p  the MCOC is upward sloping. In which 
case, a rise in B0 steepens the MCOC curve and shifts it upward 
and therefore reduces T° as displayed in Figure 3a. When y<p 
the MCOC is downward sloping. In which case, a rise in B0 
steepens the MCOC curve and shifts it downward and 
therefore increases T° as displayed in Figure 3b. However, 
when y=p the MCOC curve is flat and its location is not affected 
by the size of B0.
16
Figure 3b: y< p, a rise in B 0 lengthens T°
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Proposition  2 (The effect of the firm's liquidation value and 
depreciation rate): For any combination of claimants' rate of 
time preference, the greater the firm's liquidation value, the 
shorter the collaboration period. This effect is fortified by the 
depreciation rate of the firm's productive capital.
Geometrically, this proposition can be explained as follows. 
An increase in either the firm 's liquidation value or 
depreciation rate shifts the M BFC  curve downward and 
consequently leads to a smaller T° for all possible combinations 
of claimants' rates of time preference as displayed for instance 
by Figure 4.
Figure 4: y< p, a rise in either S0 or 8 shortens the collabor 
ation period
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Proposition 3 (The effect of the bond's contracted interest rate): 
< ^ % 0 a s [ l - ( i - p ) T o ]  e (l'p)T° f  // + (i-y)T°] e (l'r)T°
That is, the effect of the interest rate, i, on the collaboration 
period is not clear a priori. On the one hand, a high interest 
rate on the firm's bonds implies a high rate of debt 
accumulation for the firm (that is, a steeper MCOC curve) and 
hence discourages the stockholder from continuation. On the 
other hand, it enhances the attraction of the firm's bond to the 
bondholder relatively to alternative financial transactions and 
hence reduces the compensation payment required for the 
bondholder's collaboration (that is, a flatter MCOC curve).
Proposition 4 (The effect of uncertainty): If both claimants are 
risk averse, then for any combination of claimants' rate of time 
preference the greater the level of uncertainty about the 
claimants' net returns from continuation the shorter the 
collaboration period.
The underlying rationale of this proposition is that an 
increase in the level of uncertainty about the net returns raises 
the costs of risk bearing to the stockholder and hence 
moderates his/her inclination for continuation. Moreover, an 
increase in the costs of risk bearing to the bondholder raises the 
compensation payment in a case of continuation for keeping 
the bondholder as well of as under immediate liquidation and 
hence shortening the collaboration period. Geometrically, an 
increase in the costs of risk bearing shifts the MCOC curve 
upward and hence shorten the period of collaboration for any 
combination of claimants' rate of time preference as displayed 
for instance by Figure 5.
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Figure 5: y> p, a rise in the uncertainty level shortens the 
collaboration period
Proposition 5 (The effect of the firm's expected profit): For any 
combination of claimants' rates of time preference, the larger 
the firm 's expected instantaneous profit the longer the 
collaboration period.
The underlying rationale of this proposition is 
straightforward. A more optimistic outlook about the firm's 
instantaneous profit leads to a larger marginal benefit from 
continuation of the firm operation and hence lengthens the 
collaboration period for any combination of the claimants' 
rates of time preference. Geometrically, despite steepening the 
MBFC curve, an increase in E(n) shifts that curve upward as 
displayed for instance by Figure 6 .
20
Figure 6: y > p, a rise in the expected instantaneous profit 
lengthens the collaboration period
7 EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL AND MACROECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS ON THE COLLABORATION PERIOD
As indicated earlier, the firm's expected profits are a key factor 
in the determination of the net returns to the stockholders 
from continuation, and hence, in the determination of the 
length of the collaboration period. These expected profits 
might be affected by the industrial and global economic 
environment in which the firm operates. This section explores 
the possible effects of industrial and macroeconomic 
conditions on the liquidation decision and timing. It is 
assumed that the firm operates in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
where all firms are expected profit maximisers, take their 
competitors' supply as given (that is, zero conjectural 
variation), and have an identical and constant marginal cost of
21
production (that is, m cn(qn) = me for all q n and for every n = 
These firms are, however, different with regard to their 
financial (debt-equity) structure.
It is assumed further that the inverse demand function for 
the industry's product consists of an isoelastic deterministic 
part and a stochastic part due to uncertainty about the 
consumer aggregate income and the prices of all other goods:
p(Q, Y, P) = Q-1% + p  (P, Y). (16)
Here, Q denotes the quantity demanded; £ is the constant price 
elasticity of the deterministic part; Y and P are random
variables with means Y and P and finite variances and 
covariance, denoting the aggregate consumer income and the 
overall price level of all the other goods, respectively. The
stochastic part, p ,  is twice differentiable; p y  is positive 
(negative) in the case of a normal (inferior) good and equal to
zero otherwise; and p  is positive (negative) when the 
industry's product is essentially a substitute (complementary) 
to the rest of the goods and zero otherwise. In order to 
introduce the effects of variations in the macroeconomic 
factors Y and P on the bankruptcy decision, a second-order 
Taylor approximation of the inverse demand function at the
means' point (Y  ,P  ) is considered:
p(Q, Y, P) =Q-1'S + p y(Y - Y) + p P(P - P) + 0.5P yy(Y - Y)?
+ 0.5pPP(P - P)2 + 0.5Pyp(Y - Y)(P - P). (17)
It is postulated that the firms' expected profit-maximisation 
problem is
22





The solution of this problem yields the Cournot-Nash expected 
product price
E(p*) = -— ~ — {m c - 0.5[pYYVar(Y) + p PPVar(P)
1 - 1/ qN
+ P y pC o v (Y , P )]} (19 )
as is shown in the Appendix.
The firm's expected instantaneous profit is given by
E[n(t)]n = E[(p* - me) qn*J (20)
and by recalling equation 22 and that c\n* is a chosen quantity 
and all of the firms have an identical production operation, 
the individual firm's expected instantaneous profit can be 
expressed further as:
E l m ln  = f  [E(p*)-mcl= IPryV arfY)
+ pppVar(P) + P ypC ov(Y, P )] (21)
where Q* is the industry's volume of sales. A priori, the signs
of the second derivatives of p  and Cov(Y, P) are unknown and 
hence the effects of uncertainty about the macroeconomic
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conditions, as well as the effects of the degree of industry 
concentration and price elasticity, on the firm's expected 
operating profit are not clear. When the overall effect of 
aggregate income and consumer price volatility on the
industry product price (that is, p yyV ariY )  + 'pppVar(P) +
PypCov(Y , P)) is negative (positive) the expected profit is 
greater (smaller) than that under certainty (mcQ*/N(t;N-l)). 
The discrepancy between the two decreases with the level of 
the price elasticity and the number of producers. Note further 
that the assumption of time-invariant expected profit 
underlying the transition from equation 1 to equation 2 
requires that the industry's structure (for example, number of 
rival firms, marginal cost of production and demand
elasticity), as well as the functional form of p  and the variances 
and covariance of Y and P, do not change as time passes.
The effects of the industrial and macroeconomic conditions 
on the collaboration period can now be obtained by virtue of 
equations 10 and 21. They are summarised by the following 
three propositions whose proofs are given in the Appendix.
P roposition  6 (The effects of aggregate price and income 
volatility):
dT° dT°
dVar(Y) t  0 as Pyy I  ° ' dVar(P) \  0 as P pp 5 ° ' and
dT° > „  <n
------------------ - 0 as P yi> ?  0.
dC ov(Y ,P )<  V >
This proposition indicates that the effects of the aggregate 
consumer price and income volatility crucially depend upon 
the signs of the second derivatives of the inverse demand 
function' stochastic part.. If the marginal effect of income on
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the firm's product price (that is, the extent of being a normal 
good) rises (diminishes) with Y, the higher the volatility of 
aggregate income the shorter (longer) the optim al 
continuation period of the firm's operation. If the marginal 
effect of the aggregate consumer price on the firm's product 
price (that is, the substitution effect) increases (diminishes) 
with P, the higher the volatility of the consumer price level 
the shorter (longer) the optimal collaboration period. Finally, if 
the extent of being a normal good is positively (adversely) 
affected by a rise in the aggregate consumer price level, the 
larger the correlation between the aggregate income level and 
the consumer price level the shorter (longer) the optimal 
collaboration period.
Proposition  7 (The effect of the price elasticity of the demand 
for the firm's product):
d T ° ~  ~  ~  ^= 0 as 0.5[ p n Var(Y) + pPPVar(P) + p yPCov(Y ,P)j = me.
This proposition indicates that if the effect of the aggregate 
consumer income and price volatility on the expected price of 
the insolvent firm's product is grater (smaller) than the firm's 
marginal cost of production, the more elastic the demand for 
the firm 's product, the longer (shorter) the optimal 
continuation period of the firm's operation.
P rop os ition  8 (The effect of the industry's level of 
concentration):
--pr^Oasmc^ 0.51 pyyVarfY) + pPPVar(P) + pYPCov(Y,P)][^2N/(2^N-l)J.
w
This proposition indicates that if the firm's marginal costs
25
of production are larger (smaller) than the effect of the 
aggregate consumer income and price volatility on the 
expected price of the insolvent firm's product adjusted to the 
industry size and demand elasticity, the more concentrated the 
industry the longer (shorter) the optimal continuation period 
of the firm's operation.
8 SUMMARY
The analysis of the optimal continuation of an insolvent 
firm's operation was conducted within a framework in which 
the firm's managers are sheer profit maximisers; the firm's 
claimants have different priority in liquidation and unbiased 
expectations about their net returns from continuation, but 
variances that are proportionate to the length of the 
continuation period, and maximise their expected utility from 
those net returns. The financial crisis arises from the firm's 
current inability to pay back the bond value (or loan) that has 
matured. The Pareto optimal period of continuation of the 
firm's operation was found by maximising the stockholder's 
expected utility from the net returns from continuation while 
maintaining the bondholder's utility level equal to that under 
immediate liquidation with an adequate compensation 
payment. The solution to this problem displayed the effects of 
the firm's initial assets and liabilities and their rates of 
depreciation and accumulation, the claimants' rates of time 
preference and attitudes toward risk, the firm's expected profits 
and macroeconomic and industrial conditions on the optimal 
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P roo f o f  Proposition 1: Assuming that all other things remain 
the same, the total differential of the necessary condition 10 
with respect to Bo and T° implies
(i-p)T° (i-y)T°
dT° ( l-p )e  P - (i-y) e r
dBo ~ H
d T ^  (p-y)T°
and since H < 0 , 0 as i = p + (i-y) e
P roo f o f  Proposition 2: Assuming that all other things remain 
the same, the total differential of the necessary condition 10 
with respect to S o and T° implies
dT° S e pT° n 
dS0 ~ H <0
since H<0.
P roo f o f  Proposition 3: Assuming that all other things remain 
the same, the total differential of the necessary condition 10 
with respect to i and T° implies:
dT° {[1 - (i-p)TO]e(t'p)T° - [l+(i-y)T°]e(t )̂T° } b0 
d i ~ H
and since H < 0 ,
28
d T ( i - p ) T °  (i-y)T°
~ j f = 0  as [1 - d-p)T°] e P f [ l  + (i-y)T°]e 7
P roo f o f  Proposition 4: Assuming that all other things remain 
the same, the total differential of the necessary condition 10
2






=  77 < 0.
d(0.5Rba b) H
P roo f o f  Proposition  5: Assuming that all other things remain 
the same, the total differential of the necessary condition 10 
with respect to E(n) and T° implies




The Solution to the Firm's Expected Profit-M axim isation  
Problem
Given the second-order Taylor approximation of the inverse 
demand function, the firm's objective function can be 
displayed as
29
m ax EllQ-VZ + py(Y-Y) + pP(P-P) + 0.5 p YY(Y -Y)2 
<?n
+ 0.5ppp(P -P )2 + 0.5 p y p (Y  - Y) (P-P)  - m e] qn).
Taking the expectation of the objective function and recalling 
that the choice variable q n is deterministic and that E(Y- 
Y)=0=E(P -P), the objective function can be expressed further as
m ax  (Q-VS qn + 0 .5[pYYVar(Y) + p PPVar(P) + p YPCov(Y,P)]q„ - me qnj .
‘jn
The first-order condition for maximum is
(fn IQ * + me + 0 5  IpyyVar(Y) + py YVar(P) + p YPCov(Y,P)] = 0
*
and since = E(p*) and q n/Q* = 1/N (all firms have
identical production operation)
E(p*) = j — i/gfij  (mc - 0.5lpYyVar(Y) + pPPVar(P) + pYPCov(Y,P)]J.
P roo f o f  Proposition 6: By virtue of proposition 5 and equation 
21
dT° dT° dE(n) 0.532* dT° _ > _ <
------  ---^ ------------------------------------------  m ' 1 1 ...... . ....  Dyy — 0  3S P  VY --w /
dVar(Y ) dE{n) dVar(Y) ^ N - l d E ( n )  n < >
dT° dT° dE (n )  0.5<§2* dT° „ > „  _ <
<--■■■ .. —1 . .....  = _  _ “ 'n~m' =-=—==== p  „ — (_} 3S T) pp — U /
dVar(P) dE(n) dVar (P )  # V - 1  dE(n) PP < PP >
and
dT° _  dT° dE{n) _  0.5& 2* dT° _ > 
dC ov(Y ,P ) ~ d E (n ) dCov(Y, P ) ~ #V- 1  dE{n) ~Pyp <
<
as p YP 0 •
P roof o f  Proposition  7; By virtue of proposition 5 and equation 
21
dT ° _  Q * { m c - 0 .5  I P yy Var(Y) + pPP Var(P) + pYP cov(Y,P)]j e  pT  
d $  ( § N -l H
and since H<0,
dT° > _ _ %
- ^ | - =  0 as 0.5 [ pYYVar(Y) + pPPVar (P) + pYPCov(Y,P)] = me.
P roof o f  Proposition 8: By virtue of proposition 5 and equation 
21
dV° _  Q * { (2 t? J - l ) m c-0 .5  I? N2 [pyy V ar(Y )  + pppVar(P) + pyp co v (Y ,P )I } e  ^
N2(ZN-lp H
and recalling that H<0,
~ 7 J\  1 °  as m c^ 0.5 [pY Y V ar(Y ) + p p PVar(P) + p y p C ov(Y,P)][% 2N/(2%N-1)I.
d\ Ji)
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